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SUMMARY
Every year, BICC’s Global Militarisation Index (gmi) presents the relative 
weight and importance of a country’s military apparatus in relation to its soci-
ety as a whole. The GMI 2019 covers 154 states and is based on the latest available 
figures (in most cases data for 2018). The index project is financially supported by 
Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. 
In this year’s GMI ranking, the ten countries that provided the military 
with markedly large amounts of resources in relation to other areas of society are 
Israel, Singapore, Armenia, Cyprus, South Korea, Russia, Greece, Jordan, Belarus 
and Azerbaijan. 
The authors Max Mutschler and Marius Bales put the regional focus of  
the GMI 2019 on Europe (eastern Europe / NATO and EU countries), the Middle 
East and Asia. Russia (position 6) continues to sustain one of the largest military 
forces in the world. The European NATO countries, especially Baltic and eastern  
European states, are again continuing to arm themselves pointing to ongoing  
tensions with Russia. The unresolved secessionist conflict between Armenia  
(position 3) and Azerbaijan (position 10) over the Nagorno-Karabakh region cont-
inues to keep militarisation in the South Caucasus at a very high level. The coun-
tries in the Middle East are all highly militarised by global standards. In view of 
the tense security situation, Israel (position 1) is again at the top of the global  
ranking in 2019. The list of highly militarised countries in Asia is headed, as in 
previous years, by Singapore (position 2). In absolute figures, China (position 94) 
invests most in its armed forces in a regional comparison. Other countries in the 
region are also increasingly investing in their armed forces, citing the various  
conflicts with China. 
Finally, this year’s GMI looks at the link between militarisation and fragility. 
A comparison of the GMI with the typology of fragility constellations drawn up by 
the Constellations of State Fragility Project of the German Development Institute 
(gdi) points, for example, to a connection between the very low level of milita-
risation of a country and its limited ability to provide pivotal state-run services 
for its citizens. Conversely, however, this does not mean that the highest possible 
level of militarisation is desirable. For example, among the very highly militarised 
countries, there are a strikingly high number of countries that score poorly on the 
fragility dimension of legitimacy. 
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THE METHODOLOGY 
OF THE GLOBAL MILITARISATION INDEX (GMI)
The Global Militarisation Index (gmi) depicts  
the relative weight and importance of the military 
apparatus of one state in  relation to its society  
as a whole. For this, the GMI records a 
number of indicators to represent the 
level of militarisation of a country:
 \  the comparison of military expenditures with 
its gross domestic product (GDP) and its health 
expenditure (as share of its GDP); 
 \  the contrast between the total number of  
(para)military forces and the number of  
physicians and the overall population; 
 \  the ratio of the number of heavy weapons  
systems available and the number of the over-
all population. 
The GMI is based on data from the Stock-
holm Peace Research Institute (sipri), the 
International Monetary Fund (imf), the World 
Health Organization (who), the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies (iiss) and BICC. 
It shows the levels of militarisation of more 
than 150 states since 1990. BICC provides yearly 
updates. As soon as new data is available, BICC 
corrects the GMI values retroactively for previous 
years (corrected data on gmi.bicc.de). This may 
have the effect that current ranks may differ 
in comparison to previous GMI publications.
In order to increase the compatibility between 
different indicators and to prevent extreme values 
from creating distortions when normalising data, 
in a first step every indicator has been represented 
in a logarithm with the factor 10. second, all data 
have been normalised using the formula x=(y-min)/ 
(max-min), with min and max representing,  
respectively, the lowest and the highest value  
of the logarithm. In a third step, every indicator 
has been weighted in accordance to a subjective 
factor, reflecting the relative importance attrib-
uted to it by BICC researchers (see Figure). In  
order to calculate the final score, the weighted 
indicators have been added up and then  
normalised one last time on a scale ranging from 
0 to 1,000. For better comparison of individual 
years, all years have finally been normalised. 
The GMI conducts a detailed analysis of 
specific regional or national developments. 
By doing so, BICC wants to contribute to the 
debate on militarisation and point to the often 
contradictory distribution of resources. 
* \ The main criterion for coding an organisational entity as either 
 military or paramilitary is that the forces in question are under the 
direct control of the government in addition to being armed, uniformed 
and garrisoned.
GMI indicators and weighing factors 
Category / Indicator Factor 
Expenditures
Military expenditures as percentage of GDP 5
Military expenditures 
in relation to health spending 3
Personnel
Military and paramilitary personnel
in relation to population. * 4
Military reserves in relation to population 2
Military and paramilitary personnel
in relation to physicians 2
Weapons
Heavy weapons in relation to population 4
BICC \ 5 \
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BICC GMI 2019
Regional and internal conflicts drive global mil-
itarisation. But the resources available to the entire 
society and the different perceptions of threats also 
play a role when countries are making decisions on 
how much to invest in their national military. The 
Global Militarisation Index (GMI) illustrates the 
results of these complex processes by determining the 
relative weight of the military apparatus of a country’s 
military in relation to its society as a whole. At the 
same time, the GMI deliberately distances itself from 
the normative assumption that a high allocation of 
resources for the benefit of the military is always an 
overemphasis on the military—with negative conse-
quences for the overall development of society in the 
countries affected, and for international security. 
Nevertheless, based on the findings of the GMI, 
certain normative statements on militarisation can 
be made. This also applies to the connection between 
militarisation and fragility, at which this year’s GMI 
takes a closer look (\ > page 10). A comparison of the 
GMI with the typology of fragility constellations 
drawn up for the Constellations of State Fragility 
Project of the German Development Institute (GDI) 
points to a correlation between a particularly low 
level of militarisation of a state and a poor ability to 
provide central state services for its citizens. Con-
versely, this does not mean that the highest possible 
level of militarisation is desirable: It is first and fore-
most among the very highly militarised countries 
that we find many which perform badly with regard 
to the fragility dimension of legitimacy. 
In the following text, the GMI 2019 presents and 
analyses selected trends in militarisation. Most of 
the data analysed relates to the year 2018.
The Top 10
The ten countries with the highest levels of 
militarisation in 2018 are Israel, Singapore, Armenia, 
Cyprus, South Korea, Russia, Greece, Jordan, Belarus 
and Azerbaijan. These countries allocate particularly 
high levels of resources to the military in compar-
ison to other areas of society. Except for Azerbaijan 
(position 10; position 12 in the previous year), the 
same countries as last year occupy the top positions 
in the GMI rankings. By contrast, we do not have any 
reliable data from some countries that makes it pos-
sible to analyse the allocation of resources between 
the military and overall society. For some countries—
especially Syria, North Korea, and Eritrea—it can be 
assumed, on the basis of earlier surveys, that they 
have a very high level of militarisation. 
As in previous years, Israel is again the most 
heavily militarised country in the world for 2018. 
With a population of around nine million, Israel 
maintains—through its military service system, with 
169,500 soldiers and 465,000 reservists—a compar-
atively very large military, for which it spent more 
than US $ 15 billion in 2018. This corresponds to a 
share of 4.3 per cent of its gross domestic product 
(gdp).1 This relatively high investment in the mili-
tary continues as a result of Israel’s still tense secu-
rity situation and conforms to a generally high level 
of militarisation in the Middle East (\ > page 6). 
In contrast to Russia (position 6), the United 
States (position 31) is not counted among the ten 
most heavily militarised states in the world. It is true 
that no other country spends as much money on its 
military as the United States—more than US $ 633 
billion in 2018. However, in the case of the United 
States’ strong economy, this represents only a share 
of 3.2 per cent of GDP. In 2018, the United States 
increased its military spending by 4.6 per cent. But 
this is a far cry from the almost US $ 700 billion origi-
nally allocated in the budget.
1 \ Unless otherwise indicated, all information on military expenditure  




Country Ausgaben Personal Waffen GMI Score Rank
Israel 6.5 5.9 3.5 891.7 1
Singapore 6.4 5.8 3.2 860.5 2
Armenia 6.5 5.9 3 853.6 3
Cyprus 6.1 5.7 3.2 828.2 4
Korea, Republic 6.3 5.7 2.9 821.3 5
Russia 6.5 5.1 3.2 818.5 6
Greece 6.2 5.4 3.2 818.3 7
Jordan 6.5 5.1 3 807.4 8
Belarus 6 5.6 2.9 799.1 9
Azerbaijan 6.4 5.2 2.8 799.1 10
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and air force weapons systems, for which they have 
awarded various large-scale contracts to Russian 
weapons manufacturers. The result is rising military 
spending on both sides.
NATO and EU-countries
The NATO countries are again continuing their 
arms buildup, pointing to ongoing tensions with 
Russia. This is, in particular, the case in the Baltic 
and eastern European countries, which put consid-
erable armaments programmes in place in 2018 and 
2019. Poland (position 62) bought two Patriot missile 
defence systems and 20 mobile rocket launchers of 
the “HIMARS” type from the United States. It also 
plans to purchase 32 F 35-A multi-role combat aircraft 
as part of the ongoing “Harpia” procurement pro-
gramme. Slovakia (position 92) ordered new F-16 jets. 
To modernise its army, Hungary (position 55) ordered, 
among other things, 44 new Leopard 2 tanks, 24 mod-
ern self-propelled howitzers, 36 combat helicopters  
from Airbus as well as a new Samoc air defence  
system. Lithuania’s military spending (position 26; 
GMI 2018: position 32) and that of Latvia (position 
44; GMI 2018: position 73) each increased from 1.7 
(2018) to 2.0 per cent of its GDP. These countries also 
increased the number of military personnel signifi-
cantly. Bulgaria and Romania are also modernising 
the equipment of their armies at the moment, which 
contributed to a considerable increase in their mili-
Table 2
The 10 most heavily militarised countries in Europe
Country Ausgaben Personal Waffen GMI Score Rank
Armenia 6.4 6.1 2.9 860.1 3
Cyprus 6.2 5.9 3.2 849.7 4
Russia 6.5 5.3 3.2 838.5 6
Greece 6.2 5.5 3.2 833.2 7
Belarus 6.0 5.8 3.0 819.1 10
Azerbaijan 6.5 5.5 2.8 815.7 12
Ukraine 6.4 5.2 2.6 785.1 14
Finland 6.0 5.2 2.9 773.8 18
Turkey 6.3 5.0 2.7 766.1 20
Estonia 6.2 4.9 2.8 758.1 25
Focus on regional 
militarisation
Eastern Europe
Russia (ranked sixth) continues to sustain one 
of the largest military forces in the world. It has 
modernised its equipment and expanded its defence 
technological capabilities comprehensively in the 
past few years. The state has a large number of mil-
itary personnel and more than 70,000 heavy weap-
ons systems. Nevertheless, the difficult economic 
situation, resulting from low commodity prices and 
sanctions imposed by the West, now appears to be 
having an impact on Russian defence spending, 
which fell from US $ 82.6 billion in 2016 to US $ 64.2 
billion in 2018. As a result of this decline, which led to 
the reduction of the share of GDP from 5.5 to 3.9 per 
cent, a slight fall in the still very high level of milita-
risation in Russia was recorded. 
Since the outbreak of hostilities in Donbass, the 
level of militarisation in Ukraine has increased con-
siderably—a trend which continues, although only 
leading to a difference of one position (position 13; 
GMI 2018: position 14). The number of military and 
paramilitary personnel has increased significantly 
since the outbreak of the Crimean crisis in March 
2014 (at the time only in position 19). The military 
budget too was increased by 21 per cent in 2019 to US 
$ 4.4 billion, which corresponds to a share of 3.8 per 
cent of the gross domestic product (2017: 3.2 per cent). 
At the same time, Kiev, following the collapse of trade 
and industrial cooperation with Russia, is endeavour-
ing to strengthen its national armaments industry 
using new cooperation partners. In 2019, agreements 
on new arms industry partnerships were concluded 
with, among others, the United States, Estonia,  
Canada and Turkey. A particular focus of these agree-
ments lay on the modernisation of existing major 
conventional weapons systems. 
In the South Caucasus, militarisation contin-
ues at a very high level. A crucial factor here is the 
unresolved secessionist conflict between Armenia 
(position 3) and Azerbaijan (position 10) over the 
Nagorno-Karabakh region, which escalated once 
again in April 2016. In 2019, too, the agreed ceasefire 
was repeatedly breached. As a result of the tense 
security situation, both countries continued to invest 
a lot of resources in their armed forces. Both Baku 
and Yerevan are currently modernising the old army 
BICC \ 7 \
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Middle East
The countries in the Middle East are highly mil-
itarised by global standards. Except for Iraq (position 
46), all countries in the region are among the 30 most 
heavily militarised countries in the world. But as a 
result of poor data, it is not possible to assign a GMI 
value to some countries in the region. Reliable data 
is missing—in some cases for years—on the military 
in Qatar, Syria, Yemen and the United Arab Emirates. 
We may assume, however, that the civil-war country 
of Syria, in particular, is heavily militarised. In the 
years before the start of the civil war in 2011, Syria 
was already one of the most heavily militarised 
countries in the world, ranking third in the global 
GMI. 
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) have also 
invested a lot in their military apparatus in the past 
few years. 2 Between 2009 and 2014, the share of mili-
tary spending as a percentage of GDP was invariably 
above five per cent. In absolute terms, this meant 
more than US $ 24 billion in 2014. The UAE invested 
a sizeable portion of this money in the purchase of 
the most modern weapons systems, the greater part 
of which are from the United States, but with some 
also coming from EU states like France. In total, the 
UAE ranked at seventh place among global arms 
importers between 2014 and 2018.3 Most recently, 
these weapons (in particular for the air force) were 
deployed as part of the military intervention in 
Yemen spearheaded by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. 
Saudi Arabia has also been among the largest 
arms importers in the world over the years; in the 
period from 2014 to 2018, it even took first place 
among global weapons importers.4 According to the 
GMI (position 28), the country counts as one of the 
most highly militarised countries. The Kingdom did 
in fact slightly reduce its military expenditure in 
subsequent years due to falling oil prices, after hav-
ing reached its zenith in 2015 at more than US $ 88 
billion. But in 2018, Saudi Arabia invested more than 
US $ 65 billion, around 8.8 per cent of its GDP, in the 
tarisation. Romania’s (position 29) military spending 
increased to 1.9 per cent of GDP (2018: 1.7 per cent), 
and Bulgaria (position 61; GMI 2018: 67), at 1.7 per 
cent, invested significantly more resources in its mil-
itary in 2018 than the year before (1.4 per cent).  
The rise that can be observed in the entire region 
is partly attributable to the increased pressure that 
US President Donald Trump is placing on the NATO 
partners regarding the sharing of costs within the 
alliance (two per cent target by 2024). Even in north-
ern and western European countries, there has 
been an increase in militarisation, albeit somewhat 
weaker. Norway (position 32; GMI 2018: position 
36) and Finland (position 17; GMI 2018: position 18) 
increased the number of their main battle tanks. 
Spain (position 82; GMI 2018: position 86) increased 
its arsenal of armoured personnel carriers by around 
300. In France (position 53; GMI 2018: position 57), 
the number of army personnel increased by 2,000 
soldiers, and in the reserve by an additional 4,000 
reservists.  
Germany moved to position 97 in the GMI 2019 
and so retains a position in the midfield: It is true 
that at US $ 49.5 billion—in 2017 it was only US $ 45.3 
billion—Germany does take eighth place globally for 
military spending. However, in light of the economic 
strength of the country, the share of GDP is a mod-
erate 1.2 per cent, whereas the share of spending 
on health is 11.5 per cent of GDP. But in Germany 
too, a further increase in spending on arms is to be 
expected in the future. In the 2020 budget, more 
money is allocated for military operations abroad  
of the German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr), and for 
obligations as part of NATO. In 2019, the Bundeswehr  
received, among other things, a new F125 frigate,  
45 infantry fighting vehicles, four Eurofighters and 
six A400M transport aircraft. About US $10 billion are 
intended to be invested in modernisation and new 
purchases in 2020. Among other things, acquisitions 
of a new transport helicopter and a new assault rifle 
are planned. 
Country Ausgaben Personal Waffen GMI Score Rank
Armenia 6.4 6.1 2.9 860.1 3
Cyprus 6.2 5.9 3.2 849.7 4
Russia 6.5 5.3 3.2 838.5 6
Greece 6.2 5.5 3.2 833.2 7
Belarus 6.0 5.8 3.0 819.1 10
Azerbaijan 6.5 5.5 2.8 815.7 12
Ukraine 6.4 5.2 2.6 785.1 14
Finland 6.0 5.2 2.9 773.8 18
Turkey 6.3 5.0 2.7 766.1 20
Estonia 6.2 4.9 2.8 758.1 25
2 \ The last GMI-value for UAE was calculated for 2017 (position 28).
3 \ SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, status: March 2019.
4 \ SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, status: March 2019.
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Asia
The list of the most highly militarised countries 
in Asia is still led, as in previous years, by Singapore 
(position 2). With more than 70,000 active soldiers 
and more than 300,000 reservists, the country main-
tains a very large military measured in terms of its 
overall population of less than six million, includ-
ing a relatively large number of modern heavy 
weapons systems. South Korea (position 5) lies in 
second place and has one of the most well-equipped 
military forces in the region. For its very large 
military with more than 600,000 soldiers and more 
than three million reservists, the country spent 
more than US $ 43 billion, which is 2.6 per cent of 
its GDP. The heavy militarisation of South Korea is 
primarily a consequence of the conflict with North 
Korea, which continues despite efforts to defuse it, 
and is still driving the arms buildup on the Korean 
peninsula. We may assume that North Korea is also 
very highly militarised. However, mainly as a result 
of the North Korean government’s lack of transpar-
ency in particular, the data is poor. This makes it 
impossible to ascertain a GMI value for the country. 
According to a report from the US State Department 
of December 2019, North Korea allegedly spent  
23.3 per cent of its GDP on the military in the period 
from 2007 and 2017; no other state reaches a sim-
military, among other things for the modernisation 
of its F-15 fighter planes. This means that the country 
has armed forces which, from a formal point of view, 
are among the strongest and best equipped in the 
region. Above all, thanks to extensive arms deliver-
ies—especially from the United States but also from 
EU-countries like the United Kingdom, France and 
Germany—Saudi Arabia possesses weapons systems 
which—with the exception of Israel (position 1) 5— 
are qualitatively superior to the other states in the 
region. This also applies to the comparison with its 
rival Iran (position 24), which in 2018 spent only  
US $ 12.6 billion on the military. This corresponds 
to 2.7 per cent of its GDP—a low amount by regional 
standards. Iran, with more than half a million active 
soldiers and more than 7,000 heavy weapons systems, 
nevertheless maintains large armed forces in terms 
of both personnel and equipment. The quality of 
these, to some extent out-of-date, weapons systems, 
lags behind that of Saudi Arabia’s models, for exam-
ple. This is also a reason why Iran, to strengthen its 
position of power and as a deterrent, is increasingly 
focusing on unconventional and asymmetrical strat-
egies in the different regional conflicts, involving, in 
particular the Iranian Quds Force. Thus, it does, for 
example, support non-governmental armed actors 
such as Hezbollah from the Lebanon, the Houthi in 
Yemen or the so-called Popular Mobilisation Forces 
(Hashd al-Shaabi) in Iraq. 
Table 3
The 10 most heavily militarised countries in the Middle East
Country Ausgaben Personal Waffen GMI Score Rank
Israel 6.5 5.9 3.5 891.7 1
Jordan 6.5 5.1 3 807.4 8
Kuwait 6.7 4.7 3.1 791.4 11
Bahrain 6.5 4.3 3.1 751.1 18
Egypt 6.1 5 2.6 740.2 21
Lebanon 6.6 4.1 3 737.7 23
Iran 6.3 4.8 2.5 734.5 24
Oman 6.9 4 2.7 728.4 27
Saudi-Arabia 6.8 3.8 2.8 726.8 28
Iraq 6.4 3.8 2.4 669.4 46
5 \ Israel is not only the most heavily militarised state in the Middle East 
but also take first place in the global rankings. See “The Top 10”.
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change shortly however; similar to some European 
NATO member states, Japan considers itself under 
pressure from the United States to increase its 
defence spending. A defence policy White Paper pub-
lished by the Japanese Ministry of Defence in August 
2018, calls for a significant strengthening of mili-
tary capabilities in the coming years, in particular 
to meet the security policy challenges presented by 
North Korea and an increasingly powerful China. 
ilarly high value.6 According to the same source, 
during this period (2007–2017), North Korea had 
an absolute number of 1.16 million soldiers (as an 
annual average) out of an estimated population of 
only 25.55 million people in 2018 7, placing it among 
the top places globally, ahead of China (2.03 mil- 
lion), India (1.41 million) and the United States  
(1.37 million).
Looked at in absolute terms, China (position 94) 
invested the most in its armed forces in comparison 
to the rest of the region. With more than two million 
active soldiers, numerically it has the largest military 
in the world and in 2018 spent almost US $ 240 billion 
on its military, which also possesses a very large 
number of heavy weapons systems. But these values 
are put into perspective if you view them in the 
context of society as a whole. The People’s Republic, 
with almost 1.4 billion inhabitants—the most-pop-
ulated country in the world—invested a mere 1.9 per 
cent of its GDP in the military in 2018, as in previous 
years. It is, therefore, no wonder that China is only 
in the mid-field of the GMI rankings. And although 
the 2018 defence budget increased by about eight per 
cent, economic growth of 6.5 per cent in 2018 all but 
“neutralised” the increase in militarisation. In abso-
lute terms, Chinese military spending has, however, 
been rising for years. China invests continuously in 
the expansion of its military-industrial capabilities 
and the modernisation of its weapons systems. The 
military reform initiated by President Xi Jinping 
in 2015, is intended to bring the People’s Liberation 
Army up to “world-class” level by 2050. So far, this 
restructuring has manifested itself particularly in 
the centralisation of the command structure and 
an increase in maritime combat strength. Among 
other things, a second aircraft carrier—for the first 
time manufactured entirely in China—was put into 
operation in 2019. 
Other states in the region are also arming them-
selves, not least as a result of the various conflicts 
with the expanding strength of China. Thus, for 
example, India (position 88) increased its military 
spending in 2018 by US $ 66.5 billion, an increase of 
almost 30 per cent compared to 2009.8 In Japan on 
the other hand, military spending has stagnated 
since 2015 at just over US $ 45 billion, which cor-
responds to about 0.9 per cent of GDP. This could 
Country Ausgaben Personal Waffen GMI Score Rank
Israel 6.5 5.9 3.5 891.7 1
Jordan 6.5 5.1 3 807.4 8
Kuwait 6.7 4.7 3.1 791.4 11
Bahrain 6.5 4.3 3.1 751.1 18
Egypt 6.1 5 2.6 740.2 21
Lebanon 6.6 4.1 3 737.7 23
Iran 6.3 4.8 2.5 734.5 24
Oman 6.9 4 2.7 728.4 27
Saudi-Arabia 6.8 3.8 2.8 726.8 28
Iraq 6.4 3.8 2.4 669.4 46
Table 4
The 10 most heavily militarised countries in Asia
Country Ausgaben Personal Waffen GMI Score Rank
Singapore 6.4 5.8 3.2 860.5 2
Korea, Republic 6.3 5.7 2.9 821.3 5
Brunei 6.4 5.1 2.8 775.7 12
Mongolia 5.9 5.1 3.1 770.9 14
Vietnam 6.3 5.4 2.4 764.8 15
Thailand 6.1 4.8 2.2 696.4 37
Kambodia 6.2 4.5 2.3 695.8 38
Sri Lanka 6.3 4.6 2 679.9 41
Malaysia 6 4.3 2.2 657.7 50
Myanmar 6.4 4.1 2 654.7 52
6 \ Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (US Department 
of State), World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 2019,  
Table I, https://www.state.gov/world-military-expenditures-and- 
arms-transfers-2019/. 
7 \ https://data.worldbank.org/country/korea-dem-peoples-rep
8 \ Tian, N., Fleurant, A., Kuimova, A., Wezeman, P.D., Wezeman, S.T.  
(2019, April). Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2018 (SIPRI Fact Sheet). 
Stockholm: SIPRI. 
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Militarisation  
and state fragility
In 2018, the Constellations of State Fragility 
Project of the German Development Institute (GDI), 
published a typology of states from the perspective 
of state fragility. 9 According to this typology, fragility 
arises from deficiencies in one or more of three core 
functions of the state: authority, capacity and legiti-
macy. State authority here means the ability of a state 
to control the uses of physical violence within its 
borders. It is measured on the basis of, among other 
things, the number of deaths by means of violent 
conflict and homicide. State capacity, in turn, refers to 
the provision of basic public services, for example in 
the area of health. It is measured, for instance on the 
child mortality rate and access to clean water. State 
legitimacy is ultimately understood as the level of con-
sent to state rule from the public. To measure this, 
the project relies on different indicators relating to 
the human rights situation and freedom of the press, 
as well as the number of authorised applications for 
asylum by citizens of the country in question.10 
Based on a combination of these three dimen-
sions, the project creates a typology of six fragility 
constellations: 
 \ A) Dysfunctional states are states which score 
badly in all three dimensions. 
 \ B) Low-authority states have only very limited 
control over physical violence, but are able to 
provide basic public services and have an aver-
age legitimacy value.
 \ C) Low-capacity states can only provide limited 
public services but have a moderate value in 
terms of authority and legitimacy.
 \ D) Low-legitimacy states have an average score in 
the two dimensions of authority and capacity, 
but only have low values in the area of legiti-
macy.
 \ E) Semi-functional states are states in which all 
three areas have an average score. 
 \ F) Well-functioning states achieve very good 
scores in all three dimensions.
A comparison of this typology with the values 
of the GMI 2019 is revealing.11 According to this, a 
particularly high number of low-legitimacy states are 
found among the very highly militarised countries. 
More than half of the 30 most militarised states— 
17 of them—fall into this category. This includes, 
among others, Israel (position 1), Armenia (position 3), 
Russia (position 6), Algeria (position 16), Turkey  
(position 19), Iran (position 24) and Saudi Arabia 
(position 28). Significantly, in the Top 30, we find 
neither dysfunctional states nor low-authority states. 
Only one low-capacity state (Azerbaijan, position 10) 
and two semi-functional states (Mongolia, position 14; 
Lebanon, position 23) appear in this group. On the 
other hand, with nine in total, well-functioning states 
are quite strongly represented in this group of the 
most highly militarised countries. These include, 
among others, Singapore (position 2), South Korea 
(position 5), Greece (position 7), Finland (position 17) 
and Estonia (position 22). 
On the other hand, among the states with 
especially low levels of militarisation, with a total 
of 19, we find primarily low-capacity states. Among 
them are Mali (position 125), Nigeria (position 134), 
Niger (position 135), East Timor (position 146), Liberia 
(position 149) and Haiti (position 153). There are four 
low-authority states (among others, Jamaica, position 
127; Lesotho, position 136) and one low-legitimacy state 
(Albania, position 138). A further four countries  
are ranked as semi-functional states (including, 
Mauritius, position 139 and Costa Rica, position 154) 
and only one as a well-functioning state (Malta, posi-
tion 144).
A comparison of all states in the GMI ranking 
confirms the finding that among the more highly 
militarised states, we find in particular states with 
9 \ https://www.die-gdi.de/statefragility/index.html.
10 \ Ziaja, S., Grävingholt, J., Kreibaum, M. (2019). Constellations of fragility: 
an empirical typology of states. Studies in Comparative International 
Development 54(2), 299-321. 
11 \ For the grouping of the countries along the six fragility constellations, 
we resorted to the respective grouping for 2015 as most recent year of 
data collection by Constellations of State Fragility. There was no data 
available for Brunei and The Seychelles (see Table 5 and 6).
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relatively low scores of legitimacy. Thus, the aver-
age GMI value among low-legitimacy states lies at 708 
index points (approximately position 41 in the rank-
ing). In terms of militarisation, well-functioning states 
tend on average to rank at a still relatively high level 
of approximately 660 index points (roughly equiva-
lent to position 61).
For comparison: The low-capacity states have on 
average 529 points and position 110. It is difficult to 
apply similar statements to the dysfunctional states, as 
there are only ten categories in this category and, of 
these, it was only possible to calculate a GMI value 
for six. This includes Iraq (position 46), which still 
has a relatively high militarisation level, as well as 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (position 124) 
with a relatively low level of militarisation.12
Above all, this comparison between GMI and 
Constellations of State Fragility data corroborates 
and complements three findings from earlier GMI 
studies.13 FIRST: One has to be able to afford militari-
sation in the first place. Thus, it tends to be countries 
rich in resources (e.g. Russia, the Gulf states) or those 
with well-functioning economies (e.g. Israel, South 
Korea, Finland) that invest large amounts in their 
militaries. Conversely, in the case of states in which 
the government is not even able to provide basic 
state services (that is: low-capacity states), not many 
resources tend to flow into the military. 
SECOND: This type of low level of militarisation 
is not equivalent to the absence of conflicts and vio-
lence. This becomes clear just by looking at the list of 
states with a particularly low level of militarisation, 
among which there are numerous examples of states 
with a high level of violence, (e.g. Mali, position 125, 
Nigeria, position 134, or Niger, position 135). On the 
contrary, a very low level of militarisation can also be 
an indication of deficiencies in the security sector, 
as can be seen in the context of weak state insti-
tutions and an associated privatisation of security. 
Strong militarisation does not, however, automati-
cally mean a strengthening of the state monopoly 
of violence, not to mention a reduction of violence 
or even the solution to violent conflicts within the 
society in question. If that were the case, then in 
the group of low-authority states—whose capability 
for controlling physical violence is low—we should 
mostly find states with a low level of militarisation. 
This is not the case. While there are countries with 
a low level of militarisation to be found among the 
low-authority states, for example, Trinidad and Tobago 
(position 145) or Lesotho (position 136), there are by 
all means also states which, according to the GMI, 
put significant resources into the military, for exam-
ple, Colombia (position 56), El Salvador (position 63), 
Venezuela (position 64) or even Brazil (position 70). 
THIRD: The fact that on average, we have the high-
est level of militarisation in the low-legitimacy states, 
reinforces the finding that among the most highly 
militarised states, there are more unfree or autocratic 
political systems than among the countries with low 
militarisation. One plausible explanation for this is 
that autocratic elites often support their rule using a 
strong military, which they must then provide with 
appropriate financial and staffing resources.14 
Overall, it can, therefore, be said—with all due 
caution, which is called for in such a cursory data 
comparison—that a particularly low level of milita-
risation could, in addition to many other factors, be 
an indicator of problems with regard to the fragility 
dimension of capacity. However, the reverse, namely 
that simply increasing militarisation could solve the 
problems of state fragility, does not automatically 
apply. It may even create or strengthen new prob-
lems regarding the other two dimensions of fragil-
ity—authority and legitimacy. 
12 \ Here, the countries for which no GMI value could be calculated were 
Somalia, Libya, Syria and Yemen.
13 \ Cf. the GMI publications for 2015-2018, at: https://gmi.bicc.de/index.
php?page=gmi-publications. 
14 \ Cf. Mutschler, M. & Bales, M. (2018). Global Militarisation Index 2018. 
Bonn: BICC, pp. 10-11.
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